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Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge
Army Department of War

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 70

[1] OFFICE MEMORANDUM—UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Date: AUGUST 25, 1944.

To: Lieutenant General George Grunert, U. S. Army,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Munitions Building, Wash-
ington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Confidential—By Special Messenger.

I will take this means of replying to your letter of August 21, 1944, in which you request a review of the files of this Bureau for the purpose of furnishing to you a résumé of the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii immediately prior to December 7, 1941. It should be pointed out at the outset that it was the policy of this Bureau to make available to the War and Navy Departments all information in its possession bearing upon matters within the jurisdiction of the War and Navy Departments or reflecting upon the internal security of Hawaii. It can be safely stated that any information the FBI possessed in these categories was furnished to the War and Navy Departments.

JURISDICTION

On June 26, 1939, the President of the United States issued a confidential directive to the heads of the various Government departments which stated in part as follows:

"It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities. No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except by the three agencies mentioned above."

As a result of this Presidential directive, the directors of the three agencies named by the President in order to coordinate their respective activities subscribed to a "delimitation of jurisdiction agreement". The original agreement was dated June 5, 1940, and was subsequently revised and reissued on February 9, 1942. The agreement of June 5, 1940, which was, of course, in effect on December 7, 1941, is quoted as follows:

"I. It is agreed that in conformity with the directive contained in the President's memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, responsibility for investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be delimited as indicated hereafter. Responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the responsible agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

[2] "II. FBI will assume responsibility for all investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians in the United States and in its territories with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and the Philippine Islands.

"FBI will keep MID and ONI informed of important developments such as—

"(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

"(b) Developments affecting vital utilities.

"(c) Developments affecting critical points of transportation or communication systems.

"(d) Cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

"FBI will act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements.

"III. FBI will assume responsibility for investigation of all cases in these categories directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigation of a designated group or set of circumstances.

"FBI to keep MID and ONI informed of important developments.

"IV. MID will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishments, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It will also assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama and the Philippine Islands.

"MID will inform FBI and ONI of important developments.

"V. ONI will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval Establishment, including civilians under naval employ or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa.

"ONI to inform FBI and MID of important developments.

[3] "VI. FBI will assume responsibility for ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat 'Fifth Column' activities (overt acts of all sorts in cooperation with the armed forces of an enemy). FBI will transmit to MID, ONI and the State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms."

On May 15, 1941, Brigadier General Sherman Miles of G-2, Captain Alan G. Kirk, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence and myself affixed our signatures to a memorandum entitled "Definition of Jurisdiction". This memorandum, in part, is as follows:

"Acting under the authority of a Presidential directive issued on June 26, 1939, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence and the Division of Naval Intelligence have worked closely together in establishing and maintaining a complete coverage of the field of espionage, sabotage, counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the Neutrality Act. The Military Intelligence Division exercises investigational jurisdiction in this field in matters relating to enlisted and civilian personnel of the War Department and in cases arising on military reservations and complete investigational jurisdiction in the Panama Canal Zone. Naval Intelligence assumes the responsibility for carrying out the investigative operations in all cases involving officers and enlisted men of the Navy, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, and the civilian personnel under the employ or control of the Naval Establishment and the outlying islands of the Fourteenth Naval District, such as Palmyra, Johnston and Wake, and civilian jurisdiction in the Alaskan Peninsula, Aleutian Islands and the Pribilof Islands. The Federal Bureau of Investigation assumes the primary responsibility for all cases within the United States, Puerto Rico, Hawaiian Islands, Virgin Islands and Alaska, not specifically involving personnel of the War and Navy Departments. Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise joint coverage in the handling of Japanese counter-espionage."

In furtherance of the statement contained in this memorandum that Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation exercised joint coverage in the handling of Japanese espionage, the minutes of a conference between representatives of the War, Justice, Treasury and Navy Departments on April 2, 1941, as furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence, on April 7, 1941, reflect that "it was reaffirmed that the FBI and ONI would carry out as promptly as possible the steps presently being taken to insure complete coverage of the alternate Japanese system".

[4] In further clarification of the jurisdiction in Hawaii with respect to Japanese matters, permit me to quote in full a memorandum addressed to me by Assistant Director Hugh H. Clegg of the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated July 19, 1940.

"I talked today with Captain Nixon and Captain Phillips, who, it is understood, will later succeed Captain Nixon when he goes to sea, both of ONI. We discussed the handling of Japanese espionage matters and the counterespionage work which should be undertaken. Both Nixon and Phillips indicated they had for years been

focusing their attention on the Japanese problem, since Japan for a number of years appeared the most likely enemy. A war with Japan would be quite largely a Naval problem. Naturally, they were concerned.

"They have developed a number of informants. They have quite a large volume of information. It appears that Anderson has recently told Nixon to send their information to the FBI. At least, he asked if this had been done. Nixon has informed him that it had not. They pointed out the problems involved and the contacts that had already been established. This at least has delayed the information already in the Navy Department's files being sent to the Bureau. Nixon pointed out the difficulties in getting Japanese translators; he pointed out the handicaps under which the Bureau will be working without the vast amount of background knowledge, a great deal of which has not been placed in writing, and the difficulties involved in assimilating the store of information which is a matter of record in the Navy Department. He pointed also to the large increase in work of the Bureau in proportion to the increase in Special Agents.

"I pointed out the difficulties involved, since we were contacting transportation companies, including railroads and airplane travel companies, and finding that they had similar contacts which they had not canceled, and that it would obviously be irritating to various contacts to have to report to two or several governmental agencies; that I felt definitely there should be an understanding in the fixing of responsibility instead of leaving it in a nebulous state as at present. Nixon stated that at present, under the agreement, the work belonged to the FBI except where the Naval establishments were directly affected, but it could be told that Nixon personally and, I believe, Phillips, were desirous of retaining a large share of jurisdiction over Japanese espionage.

"They stated they would join in a recommendation as follows:

[5] "(1) The full responsibility for all intelligence work relating to Japan and Japanese in the United States and in the Territory of Hawaii would be assumed by ONI.

"(2) In the event any case investigated by them reached a point where they believed prosecution was desirable, they would submit all facts and information to the FBI with the request that the information be examined and such investigations as were necessary from a standpoint of getting legal evidence be conducted by the FBI with a view of presenting the facts to the U. S. Attorney for prosecution; that such investigations conducted by the FBI would be made only in cases wherein prosecution was desired and upon the specific request of ONI.

"(3) Any information in possession of the FBI or which the FBI receives in the future concerning Japanese or intelligence work relating to Japan or Japanese would be transmitted to ONI; all information presently in the possession of ONI, with the exception of the names of certain confidential informants of ONI, will be furnished to the FBI; and in the future, information in these categories as it is received will be furnished by ONI to the FBI. The purpose of the FBI receiving any of this information would be, not for investigative purposes, but so that the Bureau's files may be completed and the information assimilated so that if, in the future, a time comes when the FBI is to assume jurisdiction over such matters, the proper background and available records would be on hand.

"The above enumerates the gist of the attitude of Captain Nixon and Captain Phillips. They were personally entirely agreeable to it. It was obvious that they could not speak for Admiral Anderson and had no authority to commit ONI to this program."

In a conference in Washington, D. C., in July of 1941, I informed Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Honolulu Office that I had advised Admiral Walter Anderson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Colonel McCabe, Director of the Military Intelligence Division, that I would not assume the full responsibility for investigation of matters pertaining to Japanese espionage because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not prepared to take over the full responsibility. I acquainted Mr. Shivers with the fact that I had informed Admiral Anderson and Colonel McCabe that the Naval Intelligence would have to assume and continue primary responsibility for Japanese espionage investigations until the Federal Bureau of Investigation could prepare to take over that phase of the work in full. I also informed Special Agent in Charge Shivers that the Office of Naval Intelligence had specialized in Japanese espionage for many years; that the FBI knew nothing of Japanese espionage and Japanese [6] intelligence matters prior to 1939; that it was not equipped with translators, interpreters and informants and could not undertake the full responsibility for Japanese espionage until it had been able to equip itself to do so. Admiral Walter Anderson also informed Special Agent in Charge Shivers of the Honolulu Office of

substantially the same facts on the battleship West Virginia at Honolulu soon after he took command of the battle force at Pearl Harbor, which was some time previous to July of 1941.

Further evidence of the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not assume sole and primary responsibility for Japanese espionage activity in the United States and its territories, including the Hawaiian Islands, and did not consider itself so responsible, is to be found in a letter dated December 14, 1940, addressed to the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu, Hawaii, by me which letter was written in response to an inquiry made of me by the Special Agent in Charge concerning the division of investigative jurisdiction of Japanese matters in Hawaii between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This letter, in part, states: "Further, the Bureau does not consider it advisable or desirable at this particular time for your office to assume the responsibility for the supervision of all Japanese espionage investigations in the Territory of Hawaii."

In another letter dated June 24, 1941, addressed to the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Office, the subject of jurisdiction in Japanese espionage cases was further discussed, and he was further informed: "The Bureau is not yet prepared to handle the investigation of Japanese activity exclusively on the mainland, and consequently the Bureau cannot authorize the assumption by your office of exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to Japanese activities in the Hawaiian Islands."

The delimitation agreement which gave the Office of Naval Intelligence equal and concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in investigations involving Japanese intelligence was known to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Military Intelligence in Honolulu. The Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu has discussed the delimitation agreement with Captain I. H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, all of whom have been associated with the Office of Military Intelligence since the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an office there in August, 1939. The Special Agent in Charge informed all of these officers that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not equipped to take over the exclusive investigation of Japanese espionage matters because of a lack of translators, language students and informants among the Japanese populace. The Special Agent in Charge further informed these gentlemen that the Office of Naval Intelligence had agreed to carry on the Japanese work primarily until such time as the Federal Bureau of Investigation was able to take it over.

[7] These conversations have taken place from time to time at the Weekly Intelligence Conferences which the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu and the above named individuals held.

I am attaching for your information a copy of the delimitation agreement which was finally drafted to incorporate all existing memoranda and understandings. You will note that on page four under the caption "ONI will be responsible for:" is the provision "2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph 1." (i. e. espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage) Likewise, under the caption "FBI will be responsible for:" you will notice that paragraph four provides "Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field." It appears evident from the last quoted sentence that the Office of Naval Intelligence was clearly recognized as having the primary responsibility for Japanese coverage even as of February 9, 1942.

Following the Presidential directive referred to previously, weekly conferences were held at Hawaii between the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Office of this Bureau and the officers in charge of the local offices of G-2 and ONI. These conferences, which were quite informal, offered an excellent medium of coordination, and it was the practice of those present to freely discuss all recent developments regardless of whether the matter under discussion might be strictly within the investigative jurisdiction of any particular agency present. In this regard, it should be noted that daily liaison was maintained, particularly with Colonel George W. Bicknell whose offices were located immediately adjacent to the offices occupied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agent in Charge Shivers and Colonel Bicknell were on intimate personal terms and their contacts throughout the day were frequent. It was in accordance with my instructions that all reports of an intelligence nature with respect to Hawaii were furnished

to appropriate representatives of the War Department, both at Washington, D. C. and Honolulu. Four times yearly a review was made of all intelligence activities and trends entitled "Quarterly Intelligence Summary". This was likewise furnished to the War Department at Washington, D. C. The last such report furnished immediately prior to December 7, 1941, was one dated November 15, 1941. I am attaching hereto for your information a copy of a portion of that report (pages 928-942) which I think is pertinent to the matter under consideration.

HONOLULU FIELD OFFICE

The Honolulu Field Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was originally opened in April of 1931. This office was closed in May of 1934, and was again reopened in August of 1937. The office was again closed April 30, 1938, due to the insufficiency of funds to continue its operation.

[8] Up to this time, the personnel of the Honolulu Office consisted merely of the Agent in Charge and one stenographer. The office was reopened again with Mr. R. L. Shivers as Special Agent in Charge in August of 1939. After this office was opened, three Agents, including Mr. Shivers, and one stenographer were assigned to this Field Division, this force being shortly thereafter augmented with the addition of two stenographers.

In June of 1940, six additional Agents and two additional stenographers were assigned to the Honolulu Office, making a total Agent force of nine, and a stenographic force of five. One Agent was designated as Resident Agent at Hilo, Hawaii. The force was steadily increased so that in June of 1941 the investigative personnel including the Agent in Charge, numbered fourteen.

On December 7, 1941, there was a total of sixteen Special Agents, including the Agent in Charge, and nine clerical employees assigned to the office.

JAPANESE CONSULAR AGENTS

As a result of a survey conducted by the Honolulu Field Office, the results of which were, of course, made available to the War and Navy Departments, both at Hawaii and in Washington, it was ascertained that there were over 200 Japanese Consular Agents present in the Hawaiian Islands at one time, the number of which varied greatly due to immigration, appointments, resignations and deaths. The activities of the Japanese Consular Agents in the Hawaiian Islands were the subject of considerable concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division submitted the following letter dated September 3, 1940:

"There is being transmitted herewith a list of Japanese acting as consular agents within the Territory of Hawaii for the local Japanese Consul. It is observed in the Act governing the registration of agents of foreign principals and of foreign governments that these are exempted from its provisions—

'... any member of the staff of or person employed by a duty accredited diplomatic or consular officer of a foreign government who is so recognized by the Department of State of the United States, other than a public relations counsel or publicity agent, whose status and the character of whose duties as such member or employee are of record in the Department of State of the United States.'

"It is requested that it be ascertained of the Department of State whether or not the names, status, and character of duties of the aforementioned consular agents are of record in the Department of State. If not, it is desired to know whether such consular agents can be considered to fall within the scope of the Act. If it is determined that [9] "these consular agents are not subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, as such, would their status be changed in any respect so that they would come within the purview of this Act, provided they are engaged in disseminating propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?

"It has been learned from a confidential source that one of the consular agents telephoned to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and asked a representative of the Consulate if he should register under the terms of the Alien Registration Act. The member of the Consulate staff advised the Consular agent that he was not subject to the terms of this act and should not register because he was a diplomatic officer under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Foreign Office.

"These consular agents are scattered throughout the Hawaiian Islands and the Bureau can readily see that they constitute a source of information over wide

areas, which if used for espionage purposes would be in a position to furnish the consulate invaluable information on fleet movements, army posts, and all general information that would be of value to the Japanese Government.

"In the event it is determined that any or all of these consular agents are subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, this office desires to conduct an immediate investigation for the purpose of ascertaining their activities looking toward a prosecution of those consular agents who have violated the terms of the Registration Act by not having registered as prescribed.

"While this office is not aware of the full extent of the duties of the consular agents, it is believed that they are required to look after the interests of the Japanese populace in their respective communities, to keep alive the Japanese spirit, and to do the bidding of the Japanese consulate. They are undoubtedly looked upon by the Japanese populace as representatives of the Japanese consulate and the Japanese Government and the Emperor of Japan and for that reason wield considerable influence in determining the actions and molding the thought of the Japanese populace in Hawaii, especially among the alien element."

This matter was taken up with the State Department which advised that none of these consuls were notified pursuant to Section 233, Title 22, United States Code, which requires all agents of foreign governments to be notified to the Secretary of State. A letter was addressed to Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, dated September 28, 1940, which read as follows:

[I] There is enclosed a list of Japanese acting as consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii for the Japanese Consul at Honolulu.

"Will you please inform me whether the names, status, and character of the duties of these individuals as consular agents, are of record in your department.

"Can you also advise me whether these consular agents come within the purview of the Registration Act. If it is your opinion that they do not come within the purview of this act, would their status be changed in any respect if they are engaged in the dissemination of propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?"

"Since these individuals may come to the attention of the Honolulu Field Division of this Bureau from time to time, and that Division may desire to conduct some investigation into their activities, will you also please advise me whether these individuals are subject to diplomatic immunity?"

Under date of October 14, 1940, this Bureau received a letter from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., which read as follows:

"I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 28, 1940 enclosing a list of Japanese acting as consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii for the Japanese Consul at Honolulu.

"In reply to your inquiry, I have to inform you that none of the individuals named is on record in the Department of State as a member of the diplomatic or consular service of a foreign government, nor is any of them registered with the Secretary of State pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 8, 1938, as amended, requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals.

"If the individuals named are agents of, receive compensation from, or are under the direction of the Japanese Consul, the Japanese Government, or any other foreign principal as that term is defined in the first section of the Act of June 8, 1938, as amended, and are engaged in activities not within the exceptions to the provisions of the Act, they would be considered subject to the requirement of registration.

"The individuals named are not considered entitled to diplomatic immunity, and the Department has no objection to such investigation of their activities as the Federal Bureau of Investigation may desire to make."

[II] After the above fact had been determined with regard to a number of these Consular agents, and it was felt that all Consular agents were acting in similar capacities, the matter of prosecution of them was presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, first in the case of Yoshio Koike on March 31, 1941. This memorandum is as follows:

"I am in receipt of information from the Honolulu Field Division that it is in possession of a certificate of appointment of Yoshio Koike as a Consular Agent in January of 1936. This individual is not now acting in that capacity.

"There is enclosed a photostatic copy of this certificate. A free translation of this certificate is as follows:

THE JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL AT HONOLULU

YOSHIO KOIKE is authorized to be an agent to receive the various requests and applications of the residents of the Onomea District for the next two years.

JANUARY, 1936.

Imperial Consul General at Honolulu

The seal is said to be that of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu.'

"The Honolulu Office believes that all Consular Agents in Hawaii and the mainland of the United States have similar certificates. These Consular Agents are required to follow certain set of rules which are as follows:

1. Notice to Agents:

Term of office is two years, starting in January 1938 and ending December, 1939.

2. Any change of residence or leave for Japan:

The Consulate is to be immediately notified. For failure to do so the appointment will be revoked and another appointed.

3. The scope of the agent's activities is restricted to his residential district and if any agent changes his residence to another district the appointment will be revoked.

4. The agent will cooperate.'

[12] "It is the understanding of the Honolulu Field Division that these Agents are not paid any salary by the Japanese Government but are remunerated by fees charged the person requiring their services.

"I am advised by a representative of the State Department that Yoshio Koike was not notified to the Secretary of State as a Consular Agent or as an agent of Japan at the time he was issued this certificate.

"Since it appears that many of these Japanese Consular Agents may not be notified to the Secretary of State, is it your opinion that these individuals who occupy a position similar to that occupied by Yoshio Koike and engaged in the same activities are violating Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign governments to be notified to the Secretary of State? Or do these individuals come within the exception to this statute which states that diplomatic or Consular officers or attaches do not have to be notified? If these individuals do not have to be notified under Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, do they have to register as agents of foreign principals under Section 233 a to g, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign principals to be registered with the Secretary of State? It would appear that they do not come within the exceptions of this statute which state that the term 'agent of a foreign principal' does not mean:

(1) A duly accredited diplomatic or Consular officer of a foreign government who is so recognized by the Department of State of the United States; or

(2) Any official of a foreign government recognized by the United States as a government, other than a public relations counsel or publicity agent, or a citizen of the United States whose status and the character of whose duties as such official are of record in the Department of State of the United States.'

"This is particularly true since the State Department advises that Yoshio Koike was never notified to the Secretary of State as an agent of Japan, or as a Consular Agent."

The Consular Agents' cases were again presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice on April 7, 1941, in the case Itsuo Hamada in the following memorandum:

"There is enclosed a copy of the report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Honolulu, T. H., dated March 10, 1941.

[13] "I am informed by the Honolulu Field Division that there are approximately 234 individuals in Honolulu who are acting as Consular Agents in a capacity similar to that of Itsuo Hamada. Will you please advise me whether the information as developed with regard to Itsuo Hamada will justify the prosecution of this individual for violation of Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign Governments to be notified to the Secretary of State, or if his activities are such as will justify prosecution of this individual for violation of Section 233 a to g, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign principals to be registered with the Secretary of State.

"A prompt reply to this memorandum will be appreciated inasmuch as it will serve to determine what investigation should be made in the cases of the other 234 Consular Agents in the Hawaiian Islands."

The reports concerning the activities of Itsuo Hamada and Yoshio Koike, as well as the reports concerning the activities of their fellow consuls, were made available to the War Department in Hawaii and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.

On June 2, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation received the following radiogram from the Honolulu Field Division:

"JAPANESE CONSULAR AGENTS TERRITORY OF HAWAII. DEPARTMENT HAS REQUESTED OPINION OF U. S. D. A. HERE REGARDING PROSECUTION UNDER REGISTRATION ACT OF TWO HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR CONSULAR AGENTS. U. S. D. A. WIRED DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDING IMMEDIATE PROSECUTION AND ADVISING THAT THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER OF THE U S ARMY HAWAIIAN ISLANDS WAS OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION AT THIS TIME ON GROUNDS IT MIGHT RESULT IN UNFAVORABLE ACTION ON PART OF JAPANESE COMMUNITIES ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY PLANS OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE ISLANDS."

On June 23, 1941, the Bureau was advised by the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division in a letter as follows:

"Reference is made to the radiogram sent to the Bureau dated June 2, 1941, stating that the Attorney General's Office of the Department had requested an opinion from the United States Attorney at Honolulu regarding prosecution under the Registration Act of the 234 Japanese Consular Agents in Hawaii.

"As stated in the aforementioned wire, Mr. ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr., the Acting United States Attorney here, wired the Department recommending immediate prosecution but advised at the same time that Lieutenant General WALTER SHORT, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, was opposed to such action at this time on the grounds that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community, although such action would not interfere with any plans of the Hawaiian Department for the defense of the islands.

[14] "The United States Attorney is in receipt of a further communication from the Department requesting to be advised if there has been any change in the opinion of General SHORT concerning this matter and requesting to be advised of the practical effect of his opposition.

"Acting U. S. Attorney ANGUS TAYLOR has informed me that he has communicated with General SHORT through Lieutenant Colonel H. W. MARSTON, who is in charge of the Military Intelligence Office for the Hawaiian Department, and has been informed that the General has not changed his opinion in this matter and will actively oppose the prosecution of these individuals by recommending to the War Department, if necessary, that the matter be taken up with the Attorney General with a view of preventing the arrest and prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents at this time.

"As I understand it, the primary objective of General SHORT is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1939, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should at this time arrest the 234 Japanese Consular Agents who have been acting as such since the enactment of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

"I am informed by the United States Attorney that he will present the opinion of General SHORT to the Department and will again reiterate his recommendation that the Department authorize prosecution against the Consular Agents."

On July 1, 1941, the following memorandum was sent to the Department of Justice by me:

"I am in receipt of a communication from the Special agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division in which he advises that although the Acting United States Attorney in Honolulu has approved the prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents, Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, has opposed this action on the ground that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community.

"I am informed that the primary objection of General Short is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1939, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should at this time arrest the 234 Japanese Consular Agents who have been acting as such since the enactment

of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

[15] "This is furnished you for your information. Of course, the investigations to date have been based on the proposition that these individuals are acting as agents of a foreign government who have not been notified to the Secretary of State, which statute is Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, this statute being enacted in 1917."

On July 14, 1941, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, in response to inquiry previously made of it by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, advised as follows:

"Reference is made to your memorandum dated July 1, 1941, in the above entitled matter.

"For your information, the Department of State has advised the Department that these individuals are not considered to have the status of diplomatic or consular officers or attaches and the Department of State perceives no objection to the contemplated prosecution of these individuals for violation of Section 233 of Title 22 of the United States Code.

"Although the Criminal Division is now prepared to authorize the prosecution of certain of these Japanese Consular Agents, it seems that the objection of Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, must be given consideration. Accordingly, the Criminal Division has advised the Secretary of War of the facts and its recommendation that prosecution in a certain number of these cases be instituted without further delay."

On August 4, 1941, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice forwarded copies of a letter dated July 25, 1941, with its enclosure from the Secretary of War concerning these Consular Agents. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised that the Criminal Division was not "prepared at this time to authorize the prosecution of these Agents, but still has the matter under consideration." The enclosures forwarded by the Criminal Division are as follows:

"Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941, on the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered Japanese Consular Agents in the Territory of Hawaii I dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecutions.

"A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.

"I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be issued to these unregistered Japanese Consular Agents, through their accredited Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution for violation of our laws.

[16] "I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute materially toward the Commanding General's campaign to secure the loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory."

The paraphrased copy of the radiogram is as follows:

"Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 9:58, July 22, 1941

"Hawaii, filed July 21, 1941.

"We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair treatment. The present outlook of results of this campaign on entire population is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and greatly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941 has been in effect here since August 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of situation, considering available facts and opinions FBI and other Federal agencies I believe not over ten per cent of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at this time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.

"In my opinion fair play demands that warning be given to consular agents to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few

individuals. It is impractical to place total Japanese population of one hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps."

"SHORT"

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, from April 7, 1941, by various memoranda had requested the Criminal Division for opinions as to prosecution with regard to various other consular agents. The Criminal Division was followed on numerous occasions in an attempt to prosecute these individuals without success, due primarily to the fact that the War Department had interposed objections to prosecution as set out above.

In August, 1941, the Criminal Division, in nearly all cases of this type, was asked to advise if it was its intention to institute prosecution of these various individuals, and in September replies were received from the Criminal Division that a decision as to the authorization of prosecution was still under consideration by the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney at Honolulu, and other interested agencies.

[17] From the very beginning of the investigation of these individuals of Japanese nationality, it was thought that they might be engaged in activities dangerous to the internal security of the island, for on one occasion, that of Reverend Unji Hirayama, Japanese Consular Agent on the Island of Maui, a confidential informant had advised that this individual had been requested by a member of the Japanese Consulate to keep this member of the Consulate informed as to the movements of the United States fleet in the vicinity of Maui. This information was from an unimpeachable source which could not be used in evidence.

On October 3, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation directed a letter to the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division, advising him to conduct immediate, thorough investigations of all of the Japanese Consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii to determine if they were engaged in espionage, subversive, or propaganda activities in an effort to develop information of this character which would overcome the objections of the War Department to prosecution. On receipt of this letter, the Special Agent in Charge immediately assigned five Special Agents exclusively to the further investigation of these Japanese Consular agents for the purpose of carrying out the foregoing instructions. All reports submitted were furnished to ONI and G-2, both in Honolulu and Washington, D. C.

When the United States Attorney at Honolulu informed Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers, on or about June 20, 1941, that he had been instructed by the Department of Justice to furnish his opinion as to the prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents, he conferred with the Special Agent in Charge, who furnished him with the facts and reports developed to that time concerning the activities of these agents. The Special Agent in Charge at that time informed Captain I. H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Honolulu, Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston, War Department, G-2, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, at a conference with these individuals that the United States Attorney had been requested to submit his opinion concerning the prosecution of the Consular agents. The Special Agent in Charge asked these Naval and Military authorities their opinion on prosecution, and, speaking individually for themselves, each person present, including the Special Agent in Charge, was of the opinion that the Consular agents should be prosecuted.

Captain Mayfield of Naval Intelligence and Colonel Marston of Army Intelligence stated that while that was their personal opinions they could not speak for their respective Commanders, who were at that time Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Navy, and General Walter C. Short for the Army. The Special Agent in Charge stated to these representatives that it was a criminal prosecution which should be determined solely by the United States Attorney and he assumed that the Commandant of the Navy Yard and the Commanding General of the Army would regard it as a criminal prosecution with which they would not attempt to interfere.

The day following this conference Captain I. H. Mayfield informed the United States Attorney that Admiral Claude C. Bloch looked upon the matter as purely a criminal proceeding over which he had no jurisdiction and with which he would not attempt to interfere, but that it was his personal opinion the Consular Agents should be prosecuted. Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston reported to the United States Attorney the following day that Lieutenant General Walter C. Short was opposed to prosecuting the Consular agents for the reasons here-

inbefore set out, and if necessary to prevent it, would communicate with the War Department in Washington.

[18]

TELEPHONE COVERAGE

In order to be properly advised of all attempted espionage activity, this Bureau, deeming that war with Japan and Axis powers was imminent, felt it desirable to monitor all long distance telephone conversations between Hawaii and Japan.

Under instructions of the Attorney General, the FBI cannot install telephone taps except with the personal authorization of the Attorney General. In order to accomplish this purpose a memorandum was submitted to the Attorney General on September 2, 1941, for authority to install a technical surveillance which would insure this coverage. This authority was not granted by the Attorney General until October 22, 1941.

It is believed that if an earlier coverage had been effected, much information of value might have been obtained for the results thereof, after this installation, were extremely satisfactory. For instance, the Honolulu Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as a result of this surveillance, received information that at about 5:00 p. m. on Friday, December 5, 1941, Motokazi Mori of Honolulu talked by telephone to an unidentified relative in Japan.

A transcript of this telephone call is as follows, and the parentheses including the letters "J" and "H" preceding each recorded conversation indicate "J" for Japan and "H" for Honolulu:

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of [19] this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in ---?--- of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and

plumbers. Students at the high schools and university have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

[20] J. Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seems to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

(J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H). No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

[21] (J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't (know if) all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now. (J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

[22] (J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

[23] (H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) off phone.

It is noted that this telephone conversation lasted approximately eighteen minutes and appeared to have some hidden meaning, in view of the language used, the topics discussed, in themselves being of a character which would not ordinarily warrant the expense incurred on this particular occasion.

The Japanese translator of our Honolulu Office completed the translation of this telephone conversation at about 2:00 p. m. on December 6, 1941. Copies of the full text of the conversation, after being translated, were furnished to representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence. These translations were submitted to Captain I. H. Mayfield and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell of the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, Hawaii. The Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Office telephoned the Office of Naval Intelligence at about 2:00 p. m., December 6, for Captain I. H. Mayfield, who was not in. The Special Agent in Charge then talked to Lieutenant Denzel Carr, Japanese expert in the Office of Naval Intelligence, informing him that a call had just been translated which appeared to the Special Agent in Charge to be very important.

Lieutenant Carr was furnished with the substance of the Mori conversation over the telephone and was requested to get in touch with Captain Mayfield immediately as the Special Agent in Charge believed he would want to take up the contents of the call with his superiors. The Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu had been advised several days before December 6 by Captain Mayfield of the Naval Intelligence Office that the Navy was in possession of secret information through which they would be able to know when Japan would move and the direction this move would take. Captain Mayfield informed the Special Agent in Charge, "If I suddenly call you some night and say I am moving to the West,

you will know that Japan is going into the Malaya; and if I say I am moving over on the North side, you will know Japan is going to move against Russia." Captain Mayfield stated that the Navy had secret information as to how this knowledge and information would be furnished by Japan, indicating that it was some code message in Japanese broadcasts. Not knowing the full import [24] of the manner in which Japanese movements would be indicated and not having been furnished with the full information by Captain Mayfield, the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu felt that strange portions of the Mori conversation might be the key which would indicate Japanese movements.

The Special Agent in Charge also contacted Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell of the Army about 5:00 p. m. at his home in Aiea Heights, informing him that a very important message had been intercepted between Japan and Honolulu, and requesting him to come to the office immediately to get a copy of the message as it was believed he would want to take it up with his superior officers.

The Special Agent in Charge and Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Honolulu Office, who had been conducting Japanese surveys and investigations in Honolulu, pointed out to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell on December 6, 1941, what appeared to be significant statements in this conversation, and stated particularly the belief that the references to flowers indicated some purpose of being able to locate the Island, and the fact that it appeared highly unreasonable that anyone in Japan spending the money to talk to Honolulu for eighteen minutes would discuss flowers, the weather and the climate, also pointing out the significance of the inquiry about when and at what times the patrol planes went out and came in.

Captain Mayfield stated he was sure there was some hidden message which would be of value if they could only decode it, but that there was nothing in the message in line with previous information indicating Japanese movements.

It appears, and seems probable now, that the flowers hibiscus and poinsettia, mentioned in the conversation, may have referred to battleships and cruisers, as there were no cruisers in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

[25]

CABLE COVERAGE

As far as it is known to this Bureau no governmental agency tapped cable wires in or out of Hawaii. The only cable facilities available were those of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company. This company declined to make available to any of the intelligence agencies the content of any messages sent to or from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and Japan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu never received prior to December 7, 1941, copies of any messages sent by cable. The commercial companies by which ordinary wires were sent to and from Japan, such as the RCA Communications Company, the Mackay Radio Company, and the Globe Wireless Company, all transmitted their messages by radio.

The managers of these companies all refused to make available the content of messages to and from Japan, sent or received by the Japanese Consul. They likewise refused to furnish this information to the other intelligence agencies. However, in November of 1941, the Office of Naval Intelligence, through Captain I. H. Mayfield and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant of the Honolulu Navy Yard, did arrange with Mr. George Saranoff, President of RCA, while he was in Honolulu, to have the local manager furnish ONI with all telegrams to and from Japan, sent or received by the Japanese Consul, effective as of December 1, 1941. On February 12, 1942, the Honolulu Office first learned that ONI had obtained the messages from December 1 to 4 on December 5, 1941. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, did the FBI receive copies of these messages.

While it is not definitely known, this Bureau received indications at least that the Army Signal Corps was engaging in intercept activity, monitoring short-wave messages going to and from Honolulu, including those sent by RCA, Globe Wireless, and Mackay Radio Company. The FBI's belief is based on conversations held by FBI officials with representatives of the Army and the Navy. Two instances substantiating this belief are as follows:

1. On January 16, 1941, my assistant, Mr. E. A. Tamm, submitted a memorandum to me advising that he had been talking to Captain Nixon and Colonel Lester, at which time he referred to the Japanese intercept stations for Japanese messages in the Hawaiian Islands. These individuals had assured him that this Bureau was receiving the results of all matters of interest to the FBI

which were obtained through these intercepts. At that time there was some discussion of adopting some type of code symbols which would indicate whether the information furnished this Bureau was obtained through an intercepted communication or otherwise. No agreement was reached with regard thereto at that time. Mr. Tamm advised that this discussion with Colonel Lester and Captain Nixon dealt with intercepts concerning strictly ship movements and not commercial messages.

[26] 2. The FBI was advised by reliable sources in Hawaii that the Army was intercepting messages, but that this was an Army secret and that intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decoding. Advice was further received from a reliable source in Hawaii by the FBI that the Army and Navy were operating intercept stations in the City of Honolulu for the purpose of intercepting radio traffic between the Orient and the United States, particularly Japan. Information was received also indicating that the intercept stations operated by the Navy were primarily for the purpose of intercepting radio messages relating to Japanese fleet movements and that this activity did not include amateur radio bands.

The Federal Communications Commission had operated stations at Honolulu for at least a year prior to December 7, 1941. The scope of their activity was not known to the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, did the FBI Field Office in Honolulu ever receive any intercepted messages from ONI, G-2, or the Federal Communications Commission.

On April 28, 1941, the Honolulu Field Division in a letter entitled "Weekly Conferences, FBI, ONI and G-2" advised the following:

"The question of Army and Navy jurisdiction in the matter of radio censorship was discussed and the method and manner of monitoring radio broadcasts from Tokyo direct to the Hawaiian Islands was discussed. These programs are being recorded by the Federal Communications Commission Monitoring Station at Honolulu and arrangements will be made through Colonel Bicknell of G-2 to obtain the use of these records for transcription and translation, copies of the translations to be made available to the FBI and ONI.

"Captain Mayfield stated that he has outlined the intended setup in the censorship of radio which will be necessary in the event the United States is embroiled in the present conflict. Captain Mayfield has already requested a large increase in personnel to handle this work and it is particularly noted that at the time of this conference some of the officers requested had already been assigned to the office of ONI at Honolulu for this purpose and it appeared that the Navy is proceeding at this time with the completion of the personnel and the complete censorship of radio."

[27] A similar letter dated May 5, 1941, contains the following:

"The question of Japanese broadcasts over JZK from Tokyo was brought up and it was brought out that the Federal Communications Commission is monitoring that particular broadcast. The broadcast is for a period of 15 minutes in English and then for about an hour in Japanese. It is a broadcast from Tokyo specifically to the Japanese residing in Hawaii. The FCC makes transcriptions of the English and Japanese broadcasts and furnishes the Japanese transcription to Washington for translation. It was decided that the agencies represented should make an effort to get the FCC to permit us to transcribe and translate these broadcasts. It was agreed that the FBI would transcribe the English broadcasts and that ONI would transcribe and translate the Japanese broadcasts. A sufficient number of copies will be furnished to FCC to forward to its headquarters in Washington, and sufficient copies will be furnished ONI, G-2, and the FBI for the respective offices use and transmission to Washington."

The above-mentioned monitoring was confined solely to news flashes and news broadcasts directed at the Hawaiian Islands by the radio in Tokyo.

For about a period of two weeks thereafter the FBI in Honolulu did transcribe the English broadcasts by having a stenographer listen to the records furnished by FCC and type up the content. Thereafter the Office of Naval Intelligence took over the whole project in order to release the FBI employee for other more important work.

EVIDENCE OF MATERIAL WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED IF BUREAU HAD ACCESS
TO TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATIONS

The telegram file of the Japanese Consul was found at the Consulate when the police guard was established about noon of December 7, 1941. This telegram file was not complete, but it has been translated and decoded.

On December 20, 1941, the Mackay Radio Company at Honolulu, on the direction of the Military Governor of Honolulu, turned over to the Federal [28] Bureau of Investigation all telegrams sent to and received from Japan during the month of November, 1941. Since the attack, all messages sent via Globe Wireless Company to and from Japan for the period from December 1 to December 7, 1941, were furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

From these messages it is apparent that the Consulate at Honolulu was very active in keeping the Japanese Government advised concerning the military, diplomatic and naval activities of the United States. Illustrations of the type of material which was sent and could have been obtained had the proper coverage been afforded are set out below. It will be recalled that Nagao Kita, mentioned in the succeeding messages, is Consul General of the Japanese Government at Honolulu.

NR 66

21 MARCH 1941

From: KITA

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummins, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and the destroyer Clark, Cassin, Cunningham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sidney—both groups on a friendly visit X The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor X It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane X Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by 'outsiders' (gaihu) until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

NR 96

21 APRIL 1941

From: KITA

To: GAIMUDALJIN TOKIO

President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st X The local newspapers said that both men said that any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington X Perhaps is Chungking.

NR 104

29 APRIL 1941

From: KITA

To: GAIMUDALJIN TOKIO

[29] The American Army transport Washington with 2500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th via Panama and San Francisco X After unloading 2000 troops 12 student pilots and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th it is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

NR 115

14 MAY 1941

From: KITA.

To: GAIMADAINJIN TOKIO.

With respect to message No 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut General Emmons departed San Fran at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

NR 134

7 JUNE 1941

From: KITA.

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.

Inf: AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON.

1. On the fourth received work from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy no extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods X The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

3192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NR 140 13 JUNE 1941.
 From: KITA.
 To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.
 Inf (have forwarded by mail to San Francisco and Manila).
 Ref San Francisco Msg #92

SS Pres Pierce with about nine hundred Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the eleventh and sailed the twelfth.

[30] NO. 147 27 JUNE 1941.
 From: KITA.
 To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKYO.
 Chungking Burma Road—Trucks.

NO. 149 26 JUNE 1941.
 From: KITA.
 To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKYO.
 Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

From: KITA. 12-3-41
 To: FM TOKYO. #363.
 Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

364 12-4-41
 From KITA.
 To: FM TOKYO.

Pm/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun FWD and AFT X fueled?

Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British consulate.

#365 12-4-41
 From: KITA.
 To: FM TOKYO

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th.

[31] #368 6 DEC. 41.

From: KITA.
 To: F. M. TOKYO.

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

No. 369 6 DEC. 1941.

From: KITA.
 To: WASHINGTON-TOKYO.

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and one sweeper entered port.

Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB-9
 CL-3
 DD-17
 am-3

Ships in dock:

CI-4

DD-2

(CA AND CV ALL ——)

PS-CV CANNOT BE FOUND IN THE FLEET (?)."

I have been advised that the symbols used in the quoted messages are those used by the Navy in referring to units of its fleet and are as follows:

- [32] BB—Battle Ships.
 CL—Light Cruisers.
 DD—Destroyers.
 AM—Mine Sweepers.
 CA—Heavy Cruisers.
 CV—Aircraft Carriers.

I regret that my absence from the city on the dates mentioned in your letter will make it impossible for me to discuss these matters with you personally. However, I hope that the foregoing will adequately serve the needs of your inquiry at this time. In the event you desire any elaboration on any of the points covered in this letter, I will be glad to have Assistant Director D. M. Ladd appear before you to discuss them with you.

Enclosures

[1]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FEBRUARY 9, 1942.

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division
 The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereunder. It is now agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage, (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the reporting agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the categories involving civilians in the United States and its territories with the exception of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska other than that specifically described in Paragraph III.

[2] 2. Investigation of all cases directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of designated group or set of circumstances.

3. The coordination of civilian organizations furnishing information regarding subversive movements.

4. Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

5. Keep MID and ONI advised of important developments, such as:

(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

(b) Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

(c) Developments affecting vital utilities.

(d) Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems.

(for c and d above, no protective coverage is contemplated)

6. Ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat Fifth Column Activities (overt acts of all sorts in groups of armed forces of enemies); and transmitting to MID, ONI and

State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

[3] 7. Keeping ONI and MID informed of any other important developments.

III. MID will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.

2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.

3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.

[4] IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval employ or control, and all civilians in Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Midway Islands.

2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph I.

ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore, and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

3. Informing FBI and MID of any important developments.

V. The ultimate test of cooperation and coordination of the Intelligence agencies is the manner in which they function under conditions of national emergency or actual warfare. There should be no doubt as to the identify of the agency or official who is primarily responsible for carrying on intelligence operations under the broad conditions for which the governing principles are listed hereinafter.

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

VI. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the Military Commander assumes responsibility for Intelligence coverage. He has authority to coordinate intelligence activities of the participating agencies, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities by the assignment of missions, the designation [5] of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong, nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance to the Military Commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the Military Commander.

VIII. It is assumed that the Military Commander will not hesitate to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

IX. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Military Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Military Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

[6] 1. Agents of the FBI, of ONI, and of MID will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs II, III, and IV.

2. In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the

benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.

3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

[7] X. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agency, the Military Commander should obtain the necessary authority from the War Department.

XI. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the Military Commander, whenever either of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended through the director of each service.

XII. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be the agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same principles will govern the Navy Department.

PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS

XIII. Under these conditions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division will operate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV.

XIV. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such amendments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the [8] subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions.

RAYMOND E. LEE

Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, War Department.

T. S. WILKINSON,

Director, Office of Naval Intelligence.

J. EDGAR HOOVER

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The information set forth below will supplement the information contained in the Bulletin dated May 15, 1941, pages 891 through 897.

The predominant racial group in the Territory of Hawaii is the Japanese, who constitute 37.3 per cent of the population, or 157,905 persons, to which must be added the residents of the Korean race who are in fact Japanese nationals although usually anti-Japanese in sympathy and action. This group composes 1.6 per cent of the people in Hawaii, or 6,851 persons. The Japanese races therefore total 164,756 persons or 38.9 per cent of the total population of Hawaii, 423,330 persons. These figures are based on a report compiled from the returns of the Sixteenth Decennial Census of the United States by the Bureau of Census.

Data obtained through the registration of aliens in compliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 reveal that there are 41,346 aliens of the Japanese race, or Japanese nationals, residing in Hawaii.

The alien Japanese are disposed to organize almost every conceivable purpose, a psychological characteristic apparently brought with them from Japan, and it can be safely assumed that every Japanese alien resident in Hawaii belongs to one or more purely Japanese organizations. An effort has been made to separate these innocuous groups from organizations which are potentially in a position to engage in acts which might be inimical to the best interests of the United States. A study of these organizations existing in the Territory of Hawaii has brought out that their influence or authority flows in five distinct channels which are interlocked through the duplication of activity, the plurality of positions held by many individual Japanese such as a Buddhist priest being also principal of a Japanese Language School and a Consular Agent or an officer or member of an organization appearing in another category. These five major channels of influence have been previously mentioned in the Bulletin dated May 15, 1941.

It has been determined that each of these channels is at least strongly influenced, if not directly controlled, by groups of similar type and purpose within Japan. The consular organization is obviously controlled by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the religious sects and organizations supervised by the headquarters of each individual sect in Japan, which is, in turn, under Japanese Governmental supervision. A large number of the groups organized for social purposes are the so-called prefectural societies, comparable to American state societies, which are in direct contact with the home prefecture of their members. The educational organization has, at least, a liaison connection with the Japanese Imperial Educational Association which has seen fit to confer honors upon local Japanese educators. The business houses are tied to Japan by reason of their being branches of Japanese firms in many instances and in all cases importers of Japanese goods. The Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce was until lately a branch of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Tokyo, Japan, and the Hilo, Hawaii, Japanese Chamber an associate but not a member as evidenced by the directory of the organization within Japan. The Overseas Japanese Central Society, as a liaison agency for all Japanese residing in countries foreign to Japan, is connected with all Japanese organizations in the United States, particularly with organizations of a civic type and in their contact with Japan.

CONSULAR ORGANIZATION

The center of the consular organization, as well as alien Japanese activity, in the Territory of Hawaii is believed to be in the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu. This Consul General, Nago KIta, has a staff of nine persons, including a Vice-Consul, Chancellor, two Secretaries and five Clerks. In addition to these the Consul General is in constant contact with six prominent local Japanese who have been termed his "Advisory Council."

It has been learned that the Japanese Consulate when desiring that certain instructions or news be disseminated among the Japanese in Hawaii communicates with the more prominent Japanese societies, they being the United Japanese Society of Honolulu, the Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the Hilo Japanese Chamber of Commerce, and the Hilo Japanese Society, as well as the Japanese Press, which follows the directions of the Consulate.

The largest and most ramified group under the direction of the Consul General is that of the "Consular Agents" or "Toritsuginin." There are presently 219 of these agents so situated geographically as to form a comprehensive information system for the Japanese Consulate. These men are in all instances alien Japanese, well educated and above the average in intelligence. Some investigation has been conducted concerning these Consular Agents and it has been determined that one is the holder of the Eight Court Rank, Senior Grade of Imperial Japan, and that at least one other is a Reserve Officer in the Japanese Army. Further, information has been received indicating that many of them are non-quota aliens engaged as Buddhist priests and principals or teachers in the Japanese Language Schools.

These Consular Agents are distributed among the islands according to the following table:

Hawaii.....	72
Maui.....	48
Kauai.....	46
Oahu.....	48
Molokai.....	4
Lanai.....	2
Total.....	219

It will be noted from the above that all of the islands are well supplied with Japanese Agents, and it is interesting to note in connection with the denials of many of these Consular Agents that they are under the control of Consul General, that there are none located in the city of Honolulu proper where the Consulate is situated.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The largest and most far-reaching Japanese organizations are the various religious sects of which the Japanese are adherents. Each community in the Hawaiian Islands, no matter how small, in which there are Japanese residents has one or more Buddhist temples or "Fukyojo" (preaching places).

The immigrant Japanese are primarily agricultural laborers and being simple folk they are readily influenced by the priests because of the respect in which they hold these men. Further, in view of the large total congregations of these churches and the fact that services are held in the Japanese Language and in accordance with Japanese customs, the Buddhist and Shinto sects are in an excellent position to disseminate Japanese propaganda. The Shinto shrines are especially important in this regard as they are primarily concerned with ancestor worship, the worship of the Imperial Family of Japan and the teaching of the Japanese spirit "Kudo." It will be further noted that many of the Buddhist priests, as well as Shinto priests, cannot be considered as aliens who desire permanent residence in the United States for they entered as non-quota aliens usually indicating that they plan to stay approximately five years.

The Homba Hongwanji is the largest and most influential Buddhist sect in the Territory of Hawaii as well as in Japan where its membership is said to comprise seventy-five per cent of the Buddhists due to the fact that the Abbott, or head, is related to the Japanese Imperial Family. This sect in Hawaii is directed by Homba Hongwanji Betsuin (Branch Temple) at Honolulu, under the leadership of Bishop Bikyo Kuchiba, who was sent to Hawaii to take charge of this organization by the headquarters of the sect in Japan. The sect also has a large number of priests who entered as non-quota aliens and who have lived in the Islands only a short time.

There are 22,399 Japanese following the Buddhist faith who belong to the Homba Hongwanji sect, which has 38 temples, 57 priests and 25 schools in the Territory of Hawaii.

Information has been received that there are 39 known Shinto shrines in the Territory of Hawaii which follow a variety of Shinto sects. However, many of the Shinto sect have sub-sects or groups within them which meet at regular intervals, utilizing the services of the priest of the main shrine. Therefore, it is possible for one shrine to house many deities and to enshrine many individuals. The congregations of these Shinto sects are not organized as in the case of the Buddhist and Christian sects and it has been impossible to determine the number of adherents to Shintoism in Hawaii. However, it is believed there are at least 40,000 persons visiting Shinto shrines.

PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

The Buddhist and Shinto sects, the Japanese Language Schools and the civic and commercial societies tend to act as Japanese propaganda agencies due to the inherent nature of their work in the Japanese communities and the fact that their business is usually carried on in the Japanese Language.

(1) *Overseas Radio Broadcasts*

The Japanese radio stations in Japan continue to direct programs to the United States through the Hawaiian Islands particularly over Station JZK. However, on September 1, 1941, the frequency of this station was changed from 17795 kilocycles to 15160 kilocycles, and the designation of the station was changed from JZK to JLU4. Upon the changing of frequency, the Japanese press in the Hawaiian Islands commented that the reception was none too good and that apparently the Japanese were far behind the United States in their radio technique. The press further criticized the programs as being banal and of little interest. The broadcasts of this radio station prior to approximately October 1, 1941, were in general anti-American in their expressions. However, subsequent to that date they appeared to be more friendly to the United States or at least not openly anti-American.

(2) *Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu*

The Japanese Consulate at Honolulu continued to receive from time to time cases of newspapers and magazines such as the "Tokyo Gasette" until the act freezing the assets of Japan was placed in effect. No information has been received indicating that the Consulate has exhibited any of the motion picture films in its possession produced and distributed by the Kokusai Bunka Shintokai (Society for International Cultural Relations) of Tokyo, Japan.

(3) *Overseas Japanese Central Society*

The Overseas Japanese Central Society (Kaigai Doho Tyuokai) has not made any headway in organizing branches in the Territory of Hawaii, but it does appear that this society acts for the local Japanese organizations in their corre-

spondence with both the Japanese Government and Japanese business houses or quasi-governmental institutions. According to newspaper comments, the Overseas Japanese Central Society was also active in the evacuation of Hawaiian-born Japanese or Japanese who are residents of Hawaii from Japan following the freezing action.

(4) *Tours*

Since the order freezing assets of Japanese went into effect, the organization of tours to Japan ceased abruptly. The Japanese press, in commenting on these tours, indicated that a number of Japanese were in effect stranded in Japan and that two tour parties had broken up while in that country.

JAPANESE LANGUAGE PRESS

There are nineteen newspapers and magazines printed in the Japanese language in the territory of Hawaii, of which only two are of any outstanding importance, these being the Nippu Jiji and the Hawaii Hochi, published daily at Honolulu. Nine of these papers are published at Honolulu, these being as follows:

THE HAWAII HOCHI
 THE NIPPU JIJI
 THE HAWAII SHIMPO
 THE JITSUGYO-NO-HAWAII
 THE DOBO—a monthly magazine
 THE RAKUEN JIHO—a monthly magazine
 THE KYODAN JIHO—a monthly magazine
 THE SHOGYO JIHO—a monthly commercial magazine
 HAWAIIAN JAPANESE CIVIC ASSOCIATION COURIER—a monthly magazine
 HAWAII SUNDAY NEWS—a weekly
 PLANTATION CHRONICLE—a monthly magazine

On the Island of Hawaii there are three publications. These are as follows:

THE HAWAII MAINICHI and
 THE KWAZAN—daily newspapers
 THE KONA ECHO—published weekly.

Published on the Island of Maui there are three newspapers, as follows:

THE MAUI SHINBUN and
 THE MAUI RECORD—both published bi-weekly
 THE SHIN-JI-DAI—published monthly

On the Island of Kauai there are two newspapers, as follows:

THE KAUAI SHIMPO and
 YOEN JIHO—both published weekly

All of these newspapers from time to time carry pro-Japanese editorials and news articles and in most instances are bilingual and printed for the Japanese residents of this Territory.

JAPANESE
 PROPAGANDISTS
 AND
 AGENCIES

WALKER MATHESON

This will supplement information appearing on page 907 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

Walker Matheson is a native New Yorker. His father was for years connected with the Chicago Tribune of Chicago, Illinois. It is reported that he was at one time editor of the Living Age and that he has a rather unsavory reputation among newspapermen in New York City.

From a confidential informant information was received that an organization known as World Reviews, Inc. publishes the Living Age and also operates a news service known as the Negro News Syndicate. Irving Harvey Williams, a British subject, who is registered as an alien under the Alien Registration law, is President of World Reviews, Inc.

According to this informant, The Living Age magazine published at 25 West 45th Street, New York City, is controlled, subsidized and operated by and for the benefit of the Japanese government. This magazine formerly was published at 420 Madison Avenue, New York City. It publishes an annual yearbook known as "The World Over", which was started in 1938. There have been three issues to date.

The Negro News Syndicate is a news service which has a mailing list consisting of sixty newspapers in the United States, including one in Washington, D. C. According to informant, it is presently in the process of being incorporated and the papers of incorporation have been prepared, although they have not as yet been filed with the proper state office in New York. This syndicate is likewise controlled and subsidized by the Japanese government for the purpose of playing up the color question.

It is reported that the setup as to both publications originated in the spring of 1938 with Walker Matheson whose father was a newspaperman in Tokyo, Japan, and who at that time was living in New York City with Joseph Hilton Smyth. According to the information received, Matheson approached Smyth and stated that there was a magazine available on Park Row, New York City, which magazine could be operated by them with the financial backing of a party who Matheson knew would be interested in financing the magazine. According to informant, as a result of this approach by Matheson, the magazine was taken over, the deal consummated, and the Japanese government reportedly put up the necessary money. The amount involved was a trifle over \$10,000.00. It is reported that the annual loss since 1938 of the Living Age is approximately \$10,000.00 which deficit has been underwritten from the same Japanese source.

The publishing name of the Living Age is World Reviews, Incorporated. When the magazine was first taken over, a private tip sheet was distributed weekly entitled "The Foreign Observer", but this has since been discontinued.

Reportedly, the Japanese go-between who handled the financing is K. Fukishima, formerly of New York and now in San Francisco or vicinity. It is believed he is probably connected with the Japanese Consul in San Francisco, and attends the annual meeting in Tokyo in connection with the budget for foreign relief work.

All salaries and expenses of both the Living Age and the Negro News Syndicate are paid in cash which the Bureau's informant is of the opinion is secured from a branch bank in or near Radio Center, New York City.

Since the transfer of Fukishima to San Francisco, his place has been taken by one Honda who holds a position in the Japanese Consulate in Radio City similar to that of a Vice Consul. It is reported that Honda frequents a Japanese restaurant on Fifty-sixth Street just off Fifth Avenue, and also frequents the Nippon Club, Columbus Circle.

Since 1938 Matheson and Smyth have had a disagreement with regard to the editorial policy, which disagreement resulted in Smyth's securing a release from the management of the magazine and is presently only participating to the extent of advising or consulting in a strictly editorial capacity.

Lamar Middleton is the present editor of the Living Age. He is an ex-newspaperman and author. He is apparently strictly an editor and is not connected in any way with the Japanese connection, according to the informant, having only been in charge of the magazine since January of 1941.

According to the informant, the circulation of the Living Age is approximately 3,000, most of this not being a paid circulation. There are no advertisements and no apparent source of revenue.

Joseph Hilton Smyth has published many articles and books and is considered to be one of the best foreign editors in the United States, according to the informant.

According to information received, the losses for the magazine have been paid by Williams and Matheson; at least, that is what the records are apt to show. Williams apparently has borrowed his money to pay these expenses, but it is not known how Matheson gets his money.

HISAKUTU K. WATANABE

This will supplement information appearing on pages 9 to 11 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

According to an article appearing in the July 20, 1940, issue of the China Weekly Review, Watanabe gets \$325 per month for propagandizing in San Francisco and surrounding areas.

Investigation concerning this individual reflects that he resides at 1792 Post Street, San Francisco, California, and his occupation is given as importer of Japanese liquor. It is stated that he has a reputation for being pro-Japanese and a very heavy drinker. He is 40 years of age and married. It is stated that although he makes remarks favorable to the United States when he is talking in English, whenever he speaks in Japanese he is very pro-Japanese. He is reportedly very active in Japanese government affairs in this country.

ALEXANDER CAIRNS

This will supplement information appearing on page 903 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

Reverend Alexander Cairns is and has been since 1932 the Pastor of the Ampere Parkway Community Church (Presbyterian). Prior to that time he was employed as writer and lecturer for himself. He has delivered numerous addresses in and around Newark, New Jersey on "My Life in Japan" and "The War in China". He reportedly was paid \$25 for each address so given by the Japanese Legation in New York City.

He has published a circular on his repertoire of addresses which includes one concerning Japan with a notation which reads, "The American mind is poisoned with hatred of the Japanese people, a hatred which is both unreasonable and regrettable; 90% of the people in Japan can no more be blamed for the war in China than for the earthquakes in Tokyo."

A check of this individual's bank account reflects that he has only a very mediocre income and that there have been no very large deposits or withdrawals. A recent check of his bank account has indicated that the highest balance in the month of April, 1941 and subsequent months was \$130.72. His deposits indicate that he apparently has not been receiving a large income from his lecture work, as very few checks from organizations have been deposited.

The 1934-1935 edition of Who's Who in America reflects that Cairns was born in Belfast, Ireland, September 7, 1871, a son of James and Mary Jane Cairns. He was brought to the United States in 1873, has a Ph. D. from Adrian College in Michigan, received in 1897; a B. D. Degree received in 1899 and an M. A. Degree received in 1909, also receiving an L. L. D. Degree in 1926. He married Mary Annie Obee on August 12, 1897. He was ordained as a minister in 1897 and was a teacher from 1897 to 1901 in Japan; a pastor in the United States from 1901 to 1906; a lecturer from 1907 to 1920; pastor of the High Street Presbyterian Church, Newark, New Jersey from 1920 to 1925; a lecturer since 1926, a columnist from 1927 to 1929; and pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Bloomfield, New Jersey from 1933 to the present time. Also reflected was the fact that Cairns has lectured in the United States and throughout Canada on the following subjects: "The Man Worth While", "Diplomacy and Destiny", "Washington, the Warrior", "The Golden Age", "Lincoln, the Liberator", "The Martyrs of Intolerance" and "The Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs". Cairns is listed as belonging to the following organizations: Linnaean Society, Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Masons and Institute Forum.

On interview Cairns advised that his present occupation is that of lecturer and pastor and that he has been more or less engaged in these two occupations all his life. Due to the fact that he has been a missionary and a teacher in Japan from 1897 to 1901 and has been somewhat interested in missionary work in that country since that time, he feels qualified to speak about the Japanese people and also feels it is an interesting subject to some groups before which he has spoken. Because of his speeches he deemed it advisable to register with the Secretary of State, particularly since he received \$25 each for the lectures given him upon Japan from a group of Japanese businessmen in New York City.

He advised that due to the international situation and the fact that it would be improper to continue making speeches at the present time he notified the State Department in July of 1940 that he had ceased making speeches concerning

Japan as well as receiving any money from the Japanese. Since that time he has had no connection with any Japanese and has received no money from them.

The State Department records reflect that his registration statement was revoked in July of 1940. Investigation verifies the fact that Cairns has ceased making Japanese propoganda speeches. No further investigation is being conducted concerning this individual.

Statement of Major Henry Gordon Brown, The United States Army

(Contd.)

Receipt of the General Certificate

On September 2, 1941, at H. H. H. H.

Special Agent in Charge, H. H. H.

Original document forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 22 August 1941. The document is the receipt for the receipt of the certificate, and is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff.

22 August 1941

Statement for the General

The original document from the National Security Staff and Staff of the Secretary of War, Department of War, was given to me by General Gordon on 22 August 1941. It is a receipt for the receipt of the certificate, and is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff. The document is the receipt for the receipt of the certificate, and is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff.

On 22 August 1941, General Gordon, having received the receipt for the receipt of the certificate, was authorized to issue the certificate to the Chief of Staff.

H. H. H.
General, United States Army
Chief, National Security Staff

Major Henry Gordon Brown, The United States Army

H. H. H.
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Washington, D. C.

Statement for the General

The attached document is the receipt for the receipt of the certificate, and is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

H. H. H.
H. H. H.
Chief, National Security Staff
Washington, D. C.

Receipt of the Certificate

(Continued)

The original document which is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff is the receipt for the receipt of the certificate, and is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff. The document is the receipt for the receipt of the certificate, and is being forwarded to the Chief of Staff.